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Evaluating reproductive decisions as discrete choices under 
social influence 
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Michael J. O’Brien5 
 
Discrete choice, coupled with social influence, plays a significant role in evolutionary 
studies of human fertility, as investigators explore how and why reproductive decisions are made.  
We have previously proposed that the relative magnitude of social influence can be compared 
against the transparency of payoff, also known as the transparency of a decision, through a 
heuristic diagram that maps decision making along two axes.  The horizontal axis represents the 
degree to which an agent makes a decision individually versus one that is socially influenced, and 
the vertical axis represents the degree to which there is transparency in the payoffs and risks 
associated with the decision the agent makes.  Having previously parameterised the functions that 
underlie the diagram, we detail here how our estimation methods can be applied to real-world 
data sets concerning sexual health and contraception.  
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 2
1.  Introduction 
Evolutionary theory is becoming more prominent in studies of changing fertility [1], 
especially those that examine changes in fertility norms over historical time scales [2].  
Central to most theories of the demographic transition—a decline in human fertility and 
mortality in a society [3]—is individual choice, often structured with the assumptions of 
rational-choice theory [4], including the tradeoff between quality and quantity of children 
[5].  This is broadly consistent with human behavioural ecology, in which fertility (and 
other) decisions are viewed as being motivated by proximate goals, which are ultimately 
driven by an intrinsic utility function that accounts for energy balance, environmental 
resources and mortality risk of the socio-ecological environment [6].  This perspective 
likewise is consistent with a positive correlation between fertility and wealth and a 
negative correlation between fertility and child-rearing costs [7].  
Shenk et al. [8] describe three models that apply within this framework, one of 
which, the cultural-transmission model, is our primary focus here.  It assumes that people 
make health decisions based on their knowledge of risks, costs and benefits but also that 
it matters how they learn about these factors.  For much of human prehistory, social 
learning within smaller communities was strategically directed toward familiar experts or 
best-informed members.  In these long-term contexts, the benefits of social learning and 
friendship are substantial enough to have been a factor in human evolution [9–11].  In a 
typical collective-action problem, such as changing fertility norms, the transparency 
about what others are doing is essential [12].  Conversely, secrecy reduces transparency 
in the sense that it adds ‘noise’ (e.g. [13]), the effect that we later quantify as µ.  
Broadly consistent with these underlying principles, community medicine often 
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 3
emphasises two drivers of behavioural change—information and supply—although in 
some models (e.g. [14]), those variables are seen as insufficient to change behaviour 
without the addition of social influence [15].  For example, in Poland poor, uneducated 
women living in a wealthy, educated group tend to adopt the low-fertility level of the 
group rather than the higher fertility that otherwise would be associated with their low 
income and low education as individuals [16].  
In characterising a case study in terms of information, supply, and social 
influence, we might use population-scale data to estimate the relative magnitude of 
socially influenced learning versus individual learning.  We might focus on the function 
of heterogeneity in how people make decisions, particularly the balance of individual 
learning, which produces information, and social learning, which diffuses and exploits 
that information [10,17,18].  All too often, however, observational data alone fail to 
distinguish not only between social learning and individual learning but also between 
social learning and homophily—the tendency for people with similar traits to co-
associate [19,20].  Sorting this out may require explicit temporal ordering of socially 
influenced events in observational data [21,22].   
There is another important dimension in addition to the continuum between 
individual learning and social learning: the transparency of payoff (and risk) of a 
particular decision.  Transparency, sometimes referred to as the intensity of choice, can 
have an explicit social dimension in terms of how information spreads—from one to 
many or from many to many—and the rate at which it spreads.  With respect to the 
successful and decades-long family-planning programme in Matlab, Bangladesh, Phillips 
et al. [23] attributed the success of the 1978 programme to the training of community 
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health workers, in contrast to the less-successful 1975 programme.  Simmons et al. [24, 
p. 32], for example, observed a community health worker in a Matlab household easing 
the fears of a woman concerning a tubectomy by pointing toward a nearby house and 
saying, “All of them had the operation.  I took them for the operation.  Did any of them 
get pregnant?  Did you hear it?”  This reveals both expertise and direct social influence 
concerning an important decision for the woman.  Because the inherent decision was an 
intense one—a frightening surgical operation resulting in permanent sterility—the 
transparency of social influence arguably needed to be high as well.  
 
2.  A model of decision making 
These principal components motivated us to consider social influence versus transparency 
of choice as two continuous, intersecting dimensions of decision making (figure 1), one 
that captures how transparent a decision is in terms of benefits and risks (vertical axis) and 
the other how socially influenced the decision is (horizontal axis).  We have proposed that 
this modelling framework can be used to extract, from popularity statistics, estimates of 
social learning and the transparency of decisions at a population scale [25,26].  If we think 
of the diagram as a map, at its extreme corners are rational choice at the northwest, well-
informed social learning at the northeast, indiscriminate copying at the southeast and 
isolated guesswork at the southwest.   
 
______________________ 
Figure 1 
______________________ 
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This decision map, while aimed at sociological or anthropological phenomena, 
has a sound biological basis in the study of social animals.  A study of GPS-tracked wild 
olive baboons in Kenya [27], for example, reduced decision making (primarily about 
where to go) to two dimensions similar to our map: directional agreement and number of 
initiators.  We might say directional agreement, which is lowest when individuals move 
in opposing directions and highest when all individuals move together, is analogous to 
transparency.  Number of imitators would then be analogous to social influence in our 
model, in which the social payoff is proportional to the product of the social-learning 
parameter and the difference in popularity between the two choices (Appendix).  As 
shown in figure 2, we see a correspondence between Strandburg-Peshkin et al.’s [27] 
directional agreement and our transparency and between their number of initiators and 
our strength of social influence.  Both approaches find the highest predictability of 
following in the northeast corner, where leadership is transparent [28].  Less intuitively, 
when low on the vertical axis, increasing social influence (moving eastward) may 
actually decrease the predictability of followers (figure 2).  In colloquial terms, if social 
transparency is low, adding more leaders may lead to the proverbial ‘too many cooks 
spoiling the broth’. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 2 
______________________ 
 
Page 5 of 35
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 6
(a) The map quadrants 
Let’s see how the map works with respect to fertility.  In the northwest, the payoffs of 
having a certain number of children are transparent to a mother, and social influence is 
minimal.  To put it another way, the northwest quadrant is where the net benefits of 
having n children (as n varies) are clearly understood, and both local and global sources 
of social influence have little influence on fertility choices.  Costs of giving birth to 
another child include the physical demands for giving birth, such as adequate body fat, 
nutrition and energy [29].  This type of cost should be quite transparent to the mother.  
Also in the northwest are decisions influenced by the net benefits governed by many of 
the economic realities of giving birth [29].  If children are net assets in terms of labour 
(agricultural work, for example), then fertility will be high, but as children require 
increased parental investment (in education, for example), then fertility will be lower.  
This is why, broadly speaking, fertility declines as wealth increases.  Inside this broad 
trend across populations, however, are subpopulations within which the correlation is 
positive between wealth and fertility but on a smaller scale.  This too is modelled after 
individual payoffs to fertility, in the simple economic reality that wealth enables a mother 
to have more children [30].  
 The northeast quadrant contains fertility outcomes that are maintained by 
transparent social influence and governed by norms of kinship, religion, gender roles and 
community expectations.  Transparent social influence might come from an 
acknowledged village expert in a particular category [31], whereas less-intense influence 
might diffuse among passive members of village social networks, who might not 
necessarily adopt the behaviour themselves [32].  Among over 20 high-fertility 
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communities in rural Poland, for example, Colleran et al. [16] found that the low-fertility 
norms of educated women were learned socially by lesser-educated women within the 
same social networks who were using the more-educated women as models. 
The two quadrants in the southern half of the map are less well explored in terms of 
fertility.  In wealthy, urban, media-saturated societies, however, these quadrants seem 
increasingly relevant.  A potential mother in the modern West, for example, might read 
news stories that debate the benefits of breastfeeding versus bottle feeding.  She may see 
vigorous debates in the popular media contesting the ‘joys’ of having children versus the 
‘pains’ of raising a child—she might, for example, see bumper stickers on expensive cars 
that say ‘DINK’ (dual-income, no kids).  This bombardment by the media about the costs 
and benefits of having children might cause enough confusion that transparency is 
reduced about the net benefits of having n children as n varies. 
Homophily might have an influence on the level of transparency in decision 
making.  Homophily is clearly a reality as parents often socialise with other parents, 
either through shared membership in schools and clubs or simply so their children can 
play together.  Similarly, nonparents often seek each other out and steer clear of people 
who have annoying children.  All these social effects have ambiguous transparency: Is 
fertility simply a matter of the fertility of those around you?  If so, how accurately does it 
track ambient fertility?  Can fertility be subject to fashion, at least within broader 
economic constraints (e.g. having one child instead of two)?  These are issues that reside 
in the southeast quadrant. 
In the southwest quadrant, fertility is not transparent in terms of individual payoffs 
or social norms.  This is probably uncommon because fertility is so strongly directed by 
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 8
physiological, economic and social influences.  The expectations of this quadrant, 
however, can serve as a benchmark to test whether the individual payoffs of fertility may 
be becoming less transparent, or, equivalently, ‘noisier’.  As a thought experiment, what 
if a mother decides to have just one child in order to invest more in the child’s education, 
but by the time the child is of college age most people are receiving free, online degrees?  
Could she have had three children instead, to better the chances that free education would 
make at least one of her children wealthy?  The fact that this is not a totally far-fetched 
scenario in itself shows that calculating the economic costs and benefits of children may 
be becoming less transparent. 
 
(b) Generalized data patterns 
Bentley et al. [25,33] describe generalized data patterns that help to locate a phenomenon 
on the map in figure 1, given time-series data on the relative popularities of different 
options.  The aim is to extract as much information as possible from patterns, such as the 
distribution of popularity for a single time phase, or ranked popularity lists and/or time 
series in the popularity of each option over a number of successive time phases.  
Consider, for example, the effect of a targeted intervention in the last decade by the U.K. 
National Health Service (NHS).  In 2003 the NHS instigated a campaign to promote more 
sexual-health screenings in an effort to reduce the incidence of sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs).  The programme was successful, increasing the number of screenings 
from about 17,000 in the first year to over 340,000 in year five [34].  The NHS strategy 
was to increase information through a dedicated website, advertising and outreach and to 
direct participants to particular options, including community contraceptive services, 
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 9
general practice and educational settings.  In addition, it promoted various private means 
of performing tests individually, such as using personal testing kits one could purchase at 
the pharmacy or through the mail.  NHS had 24 different types of offerings by 2008 
(NCSP 2008).  
One question we might ask is how the decision environment of sexual-health 
screenings (at the regional or national scale) moved around on the map as the health 
department increased the amount of information, number of options and overall 
participation.  Social influence may or may not have increased with more participation, 
and decisions may have become (a) more transparent as the NHS communicated 
cost/benefit information about screenings or (b) less transparent with the increase in 
options (and associated experts).  Ideally, we would like to have popularity data on each 
option over the course of the programme, at finely resolved time intervals [25,33], such 
as monthly or quarterly data on the number of STI tests done, for each of the half-dozen 
options, over a decade and subdivided by gender, county, ethnicity and the like.  In 
reality, the data available in this case include the popularity of the different choices, by 
gender, for two time periods: one at the start of the programme in 2003 and another for 
the end of the first phase of the programme in 2007–2008 [34].  Another data set offered 
by the NHS presents quarterly statistics on the popularity of each option but for only two 
years (2012 and 2013) and without data on the frequencies of less-popular options, which 
are subsumed under the category ‘other’.  
Consider the two distributions of choice popularity shown in figure 3, one from 
2003–2004 and the other from 2007–2008.  The number of options listed in the data 
tables [34] was 10 in 2003–2004 and increased to 14 in 2007–2008.  Even with these 
Page 9 of 35
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb
Submitted to Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B - Issue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
 10 
numbers we can find that the distribution was probably log-normal, which is a type of 
long-tailed probability-distribution function that we expect in the eastern part of the map, 
where social influence contributes to the multiplicative growth, or proportional 
advantage, in the popularity of choices.  Here is a simple model that generates a log-
normal distribution at each date t as well as a limiting distribution that is log-normal with 
finite mean and variance.  Assume the popularity, nt, of a choice at time t is given by the 
stochastic process 01 ,  0 1t
g e
t tn n e
σρ ρ+−= < < , where the process {et} is independently and 
identically distributed normally with mean zero and variance one.  It follows by taking 
logs that ln(nt) conditional on nt-1 is normally distributed, with mean g0 and variance σ2.  
The stationary distribution of log(n(t)) is normal, with a finite mean and variance.  
 
______________________ 
Figure 3 
______________________ 
 
So far, this would place the phenomenon in the eastern part of the map.  Figure 3 
shows that the peak of the log-normal distribution did not change much between 2003–
2004 and 2007–2008, except that the distribution became narrower for the decisions of 
both women and men.  This implies that the variance in the rate of multiplicative growth, 
σ, became smaller.  If that variance were correlated with transparency of social 
learning—a doctor’s recommendation carries more weight than an advertisement by a 
pharmacy—we could hypothesize that transparency actually increased between 2003 and 
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2008, despite the increase in number of options.  Note also that the peak occurs at a 
higher popularity value among men’s choices. 
With this hypothesis in mind, we can turn to a second set of information, 
consisting of time-series data on the popularity of options in 2012 and 2013 [35].  These 
data have quarterly resolution, but unfortunately, frequencies of the least-popular options 
are subsumed under ‘other’.  Nevertheless, we gain an additional, complementary insight 
by looking at these timelines (figure 4).  As we proposed previously [25], generally the 
farther south on the map one goes, the noisier and less predictable the time series are for 
the different options, with flat, parallel time series generally indicating high transparency, 
except when a discovery is made and adopted.  From the 2012–2013 U.K. screening data, 
we can see that the timelines from different regions are generally very smooth and 
parallel, but with some regions (e.g. Avon, Gloucester and Wiltshire) more so than others 
(e.g. North East).  In the North East, choices were much more volatile than in the other 
regions—a pattern that needs to be explained through further work.  The upper right 
panel in figure 4 illustrates the effect of the supply of a new health service (a discovery) 
in Cumbria and Lancashire in late 2013.  There, contraception and sexual health services 
almost overnight became the most popular options.  
 
______________________ 
Figure 4 
______________________ 
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3.  Parameterizing the map  
In anticipation of future applications that use much larger data sets, we parameterised the 
vertical axis of the map as b (or bt if it changes through time), which represents the 
transparency of decision payoffs, from absolutely transparent along the upper edge (bt = 
∞) to completely opaque at the lower edge (bt = 0).  The learning dimension—the 
horizontal axis—is parameterised by Jt, which represents the continuum from decisions 
made individually at the far left edge (Jt = 0) to pure social decision making, or copying, 
at the far right edge (Jt = ∞).   
Our approach is derived from the discrete-choice random-utility model, 
                                                                                    (1) 
where the random variables  are independently and identically 
distributed with an extreme-value distribution [36].  Here, the parameter µ  in equation 
(1) scales the amount of noise in choice making.  If 0µ = , the decision maker just 
chooses with probability one the choice k*, where  is the largest.  Our 
intensity-of-choice parameter, b , is proportional to 1/ µ .  If 0b = , i.e. µ = ∞ , each 
choice k is made with probability 1/N.  We define an increase in transparency as an 
increase in the parameter b .  Any context in which b  increases, i.e. reduces µ  , is an 
increase in transparency for us.  There are many different reasons why µ  decreases (or 
increases) when a group of decision makers are making a choice over N alternatives.  If 
transparency becomes very small, then µ becomes very large, and the contribution of the 
intrinsic utilities, Uk, of the different options becomes negligible.  For example, 
increasing easily available information about the benefits and costs of different 
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contraceptive methods should increase b , i.e. decrease µ .  At the same time, if 
transparency is small, a large degree of social influence, J, and/or conformity of practice 
(high pk for the consensus-choice k) could offset the effects of the noise component, .  
This gives the model scope to account for cases where human social learning occurs over 
many generations with no explicit understanding of problems (e.g. [37]). 
In resolving both axes together, the map calls for traditional and novel forms of 
time-series analysis of the form and temporal dynamics of popularity distributions.   In the 
Appendix we describe the details of the multinomial logit framework for the general case 
of N choices, in which k = 1, 2, …N indexes the N different choices and Uk is the inherent 
utility of choice k.  We have defined the map space analytically as functions of 
observable co-variates and estimated parameters [26,36].  In expressing probability, Pk, 
of choice k (vs. choice probability, 1P ), we parameterise b and J in terms of observable 
variables:   
 
                   (2) 
 
Here, , ,i g t  denote a person or subgroup of group g at date t.  The quantity 1 1( )ikgt i gtx xϕ −  
represents the difference in the personal component of payoff of the individual choice k 
over choice 1, excluding the social component of payoff, which is the second term in (2).   
The key to applying this framework to a real-world case study is the proposal that 
the covariate vectors , ,x y z  represent observable quantities that can be constructed from 
data [36].  If we index the covariates by agent i, group g and time t, then the covariates 
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for each agent can include those that predict the propensity of the behavior, denoted by 
xitg, those associated with the presence of social influence, yitg , and those that relate how 
variable the choices were through time, zitg.  Parameter vectors θ, φ1, and φ2 operate on 
covariates denoted by vectors x, y and z, respectively.  Parameter vector φ1 represents an 
individual’s sensitivity to differences in choice, acting on the payoff difference between 
options, and parameter vector φ2 represents the transparency of social influence, which 
acts on the popularity of the option.  Estimating the parameter vector φ1 determines the 
individual sensitivity t  differences in choice 1( )kx x− .   
In studies of fertility choice, as discussed above, the social-choice transparency, 
φ2, could reflect the tendency to have the same number of children as other mothers, 
whose success and/or education has become more socially visible.  In this formulation of 
equation (2), social learning is part of the payoff, which corresponds to the fitness of the 
chosen behaviour.  On a fitness landscape, a group might be on a local peak but not 
necessarily the globally optimal peak among multiple equilibria.  In our parameterised 
map above, there can be a unique set of optima for each pair of b and J, each number of 
options N and each set of intrinsic utility values U.  For a binary decision, such as 
whether or not to have a child, we would define N = 2, but for other decisions, such as 
which form of contraception to use (potentially including none), we would have N > 2 
(e.g. pill, IUD, condom, surgery and so on).  Because the social part of the fitness 
function depends on the relative popularity of each choice taken, the fitness landscape 
becomes more rugged moving to the right (figure 1), as the sensitivity to social influence, 
J, increases.  We describe this in more detail in the Appendix.  It actually becomes 
difficult to define the fitness landscape for multiple different options, even for N > 3 
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options [28].   
 
4.  Methods of estimating coordinates on b and J 
In order to estimate coordinates on the dimensions b and J, we can use nonlinear least 
squares and the parameterisation above through a log-odds regression [26].  As described 
in the Appendix, we can estimate bitg = b(θ, zitg) as well as the other parameters of the 
choice dynamics once we have adequate time-series data on a vector of covariates, xitg, 
and have parameterised the transparency-of-choice function, bitg = b(θ, zitg).  Estimating 
the parameter vector φ2 empirically determines the social-influence function, J(.).  Brock 
et al. [26] generated artificial data to see how these estimates can be used to describe a 
path through the map for each agent i in each group g for which we have data at date t.  
For example, data for a binary choice (N = 2) might have φ2 = 1, φ1 = 1 and  θ = 5, with 
group size G = 100 and M = 100 agents per group.  In figure 5, the red dots are simulated 
data, and the blue dots are our estimates.  We can see that the largest discrepancies are in 
the vertical dimension, which is why we aim to improve the estimation of transparency of 
choice. 
 
______________________ 
Figure 5 
______________________ 
 
Having demonstrated its potential for simulated data, our objective is to apply the 
diagram to population-scale data on fertility choices and/or contraception use, sampled 
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frequently (e.g. monthly) over a period of many years.  A good data set to which we 
could apply our framework is the 33-year record (1977–2010) of contraceptive choices in 
Matlab, an exceptional long-term data set on about 250,000 people, comprising 
information collected since 1977 in a region where many health and family-planning 
interventions have been made [8,24,38].  The available data are records of decisions, 
together with associated (anonymous) details of the individuals making those decisions, 
including total fertility, surviving children, age at marriage, household income, education 
and media exposure.  Additionally, Shenk et al. [8] surveyed 944 women from two areas, 
in three adult age categories, with recorded variables similar to those above. 
The Matlab data were recorded fortnightly, so T in this case would be on the order 
of 850.  There were 80 different catchments of community health workers, so G = 80.  
We can approximate the number of people per village, M, at about 1200 initially in 1977, 
when the Matlab area included 180,000 people in 149 villages [39].   Among the five 
main options for contraception, we might initially rank the inherent payoff, x, 
hypothetically as tubectomy < injection < IUD < pill < condom.  In other words, 
tubectomy has a higher cost/benefit ratio than asking a partner to use a condom.  In terms 
of social visibility, y, the ranking could be considerably different and probably more 
variable through time, depending on region-wide conversations that take place and even 
potentially on individual preferences of the individual community health workers.   
What we need to determine from the data for the example of having k children 
(for different k > 0) compared to none are (a) the covariates x that influence the individual 
component of the difference in payoff from having k children to having no children, (b) 
the covariates y that influence the social component of payoff from having k children to 
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having none and (c) the covariates z that influence the function, b(.), which governs the 
precision of choice between k children and none.  These covariates might be derived from 
statistics such as total fertility, religion, surviving children, age at marriage, household 
income or education, as in the data used by Shenk et al. [8].  
Data sets such as the Matlab data may be rich enough to estimate our model 
framework.  The vector of parameters representing a person’s sensitivity to inherent 
payoff, 1ϕ  in the term 1 1( )ikgt i gtx xϕ − , could potentially be estimated using covariates 
such as a wife’s education, a husband’s primary occupation, family land ownership and 
whether a family is engaged in agriculture [8].  In this case, 1ϕ  would be a four-
dimensional vector with one parameter to be estimated for each covariate.  In order to 
attempt to separate social influences from the endogenous social effects that have a social 
multiplier [40], we could add a term 1 1( )kgt gtx xψ − , where kgtx  denotes the averages of 
relevant covariates over the relevant reference group, g.   
If the bari—a patrilineal group often consisting of 2–6 houses arranged around a 
courtyard [41], though frequently larger in more densely settled villages—is too small for 
use in calculating an average measure, the next largest reference group, for example, the 
village, would be the best choice.  We expect the strength of social interactions to be 
strongest at the bari level and somewhat weaker at the village level.  Based on the work 
of Shenk et al. [8], child deaths in each bari or village, infant mortality rate and the 
number of women in each health worker’s intervention area appear to be reasonable 
candidates for contextual variables. 
The vector of parameters 2ϕ  might be estimated for well-chosen specifications of 
the function 2( , )igtJ yϕ  for a vector of covariates such as average number of children 
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born to women in the same reference group as person or subgroup i  of that reference 
group.  As already mentioned, however, it is difficult to prove social influence from the 
data, as opposed to contextual effects [40] and/or selection biases sorting unobservable 
covariates that influence fertility.  It usually is the convention in empirical work using 
discrete-choice models [42] to normalize the intensity-of-choice function (.)b  to a 
constant, i.e. unity.  Brock et al. [26] discuss how one might estimate (.)b  up to scale by 
using data over time, but they also show through simulation that it is more difficult to 
estimate (.)b  with as much precision as other parameters such as 1 1 2, ,ϕ ψ ϕ .   
One possible approach to estimating the intensity-of-choice function is to 
normalize (.)b  to unity for a first time segment of the data (t = 1) and to estimate the 
parameters 1 1 2, ,ϕ ψ ϕ  for that time segment.  Then, estimate those same three parameters 
of b for each subsequent segment.  If the estimates scale approximately proportional to 
those parameters at t = 1, then we have a means of estimating change in b(.) over time as 
a simple function of those parameters.  If there are approximate scale factors 
 
b[t1+1,t2 ],b[t2+1,t3],...  , they could serve as estimates of the function (.)b .  Even with ideal data 
available, attempting to extract approximate proportional scale factors may often be the 
best way to estimate b(.) [26].   
  
5.  Conclusions 
What contribution does our model bring to the table?  Other models (e.g. [43]) allow for 
errors in payoff estimation—our transparency dimension—but usually with no social 
influence.  A few models, although they consider social influence (e.g. [44]), do not 
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explicitly consider the econometric problem of identifying and estimating the strength of 
endogenous social interactions [36,45,46].  In addition, they do not employ elements of 
discrete-choice econometrics [47], nor, with two exceptions [26,42], do they estimate the 
intensity-of-choice (transparency) function, b(.), using observational data. 
Our contribution here is combining the tools for these estimations and suggesting 
how to apply the tools to fertility-related choices.  The toolbox is valuable because 
endogenous social interactions possess a ‘social multiplier’, which can be exploited to 
promote desired target behaviour by policy (e.g. a lowering of fertility or increased 
adoption of pit toilets, birth-control methods and the like).  Estimating these models 
without correction for group-selection effects, correlated effects, correlated 
unobservables and general contextual effects easily leads to spurious findings of 
endogenous social interactions [36,40,46].  This problem occurs in the presence of many 
other social influences that do not possess a social multiplier [40,45]. 
Our framework was designed specifically to estimate social influence and 
transparency of choice from aggregated, anonymous decision data, even when we lack 
survey data about the motivations of individual decision makers.  The next step will be to 
apply our parameterised model to real data, such as the contraception and fertility data 
from Matlab, potentially to map a trajectory in terms of the parameters bt and Jt and 
determine how they change through time.  Recall that each time-dependent variable is a 
vector, or list, not just a value.  The variable x is a list of covariates that determine 
differences in payoff to different choices; the variable y is a list of covariates that one 
thinks will play a role in payoffs to social visibility; and the variable z is a list of 
covariates that one thinks will play a role in the precision of choice making over time. 
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In contrast to ancient contexts, major challenges today, such as global health, 
inequality and environmental change, are not transparent to many people either socially 
or factually.  Often people make decisions based on emotions or hearsay.  If our null 
hypothesis is to assume individuals make decisions with clarity of payoffs interpreted 
through an evolved psychological utility function, then departures from that null should 
include decisions made without clarity of payoff or through social influence, which may 
underlie substantial intercommunity variation in social norms and perceived costs and 
benefits [48].  Classic studies of social conformity [49], as well as more recent 
experiments [50,51], confirm that social interaction can substantially undermine the 
independence of the judgments of participants.  Conversely, although individual 
‘rational’ learners may be in the minority, certain studies indicate that if their decisions 
are consistent or intense, they will guide a majority of social learners to a common goal 
[52–54].   
As decisions are increasingly mediated by online technologies [55], our 
framework may help with questions about change in the magnitude of social influence 
and the transparency (intensity) of its effect.  In an age deluged by information, options 
and influences, transparency of social learning becomes a vital issue.  More research is 
needed to characterize the strength of potential causal pathways over time and to 
document the potential importance of social influences on fertility behaviour.  
Endogenous social interactions are of special interest because the potential social-
multiplier effect can be exploited by policy to induce a ripple effect on fertility behaviour 
across communities.  We believe the map shown in figure 1 is a useful organizing 
framework once it is operationalised within a precise statistical framework. 
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Figure Captions: 
Figure 1.  A diagram depicting domains of human decision making, based on a 
continuum from individual learning to social learning on the horizontal axis (J) and the 
transparency of payoffs informing a decision (intensity of choice) on the vertical axis (b).  
After [25].   
Figure 2. A comparison between a plot for understanding the group movement among 
social animals and the outcome of the decision heuristic in figure 1.  The figure on the 
left refers to field data among wild baboons [27] showing directional agreement among 
initiators of movement on the vertical axis and the number of initiators on the horizontal 
axis.  On the right is a contour plot in the framework of figure 1, showing the maximum 
fitness for three choices when that fitness is defined as a function of both the inherent 
utility of the choice and its social popularity [28].  The plot on the right shows the 
maximum fitness at each coordinate because multiple equilibria may be possible at each 
point.  
Figure 3. Distributions of choice popularity for 2003–2004 (left) and 2007–2008 (right).  
Data shown for females in red and males in blue. The number of options listed in the data 
tables [34] was 10 in 2003–2004 and increased to 14 in 2007–2008.  For each distribution 
the line shows the maximum likelihood estimate for a log-normal function described by 
log-normal mean, g0, and standard deviation, σ, as follows: for 2003–2004, (g0, σ) = 
(5.82, 2.29) for women and (4.01, 1.85) for men; for 2007–2008, (g0, σ) = (9.03, 1.33) for 
women and (8.10, 1.74) for men. 
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Figure 4. Representative timelines for the popularity of different STI screening options in 
the United Kingdom for each quarter of the years 2012 and 2013 [35].  The publicly 
available data are specifically the numbers of chlamydia tests for 15–24 year olds, 
grouped by testing-service type and by region (designated by “Upper Local Authority” in 
terms of the divisions of the U.K. National Health Service).  Abbreviations: GUM—
genito-urinary medicine; GP—general practitioner (local doctor); CSHS—contraception 
and sexual health services; TOP—termination of pregnancy.  
Figure 5. Diagram comparing nonlinear least-squares estimates (blue dots) against 
simulations (red dots) of the model defined by equations A4 and A5 in the Appendix.   
After [24].  The simulations (red dots) used two choices, and the axes are measured in 
units of the parameter values (from equation A5) for choice intensity, θ, on the vertical 
axis and social-influence intensity, φ2, on the horizontal axis. 
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A diagram depicting domains of human decision making, based on a continuum from individual learning to 
social learning on the horizontal axis (J) and the transparency of payoffs informing a decision (transparency 
of choice) on the vertical axis (b) (after Bentley et al. 2014).  
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